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Abstract 
 
 
Unlike previous papers, which have focused on the timeliness ranks, we examine Value 
Line’s 3-5 year projections for stock returns, earnings, sales and related measures. We 
find that Value Line’s stock return and earnings forecasts exhibit large positive bias, 
although their sales predictions do not. For stock returns, Value Line's projections lack 
predictive power; for other variables predictive power may exist to some degree. Our 
findings suggest the spectacular past performance of the timeliness indicator reflects 
either close alignment with other known anomalies or data mining, and that investors and 
researchers should use Value Line's long term projections with caution.  
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An Examination of Value Line’s Long Term Projections 
 
 The Value Line Investment Survey follows approximately 1600 stocks. It has been continuously 
published for many decades and is widely used by investors. Value Line publishes a timeliness rank that 
forecasts stock price performance over the following 6-12 months. The performance of this indicator has 
been the focus of dozens of published articles beginning with Shelton (1967). Other notable studies 
include Kaplan and Weil (1973), Holloway (1981), Stickel (1985), Huberman and Kandel (1987,1990), 
Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992) and Choi (2000). The consensus of these and other studies is that 
after controlling for systematic risk factors, Value Line timeliness ranks have substantial predictive power 
for future short-term stock returns. Although it is true that much of the abnormal returns occur shortly 
after changes in the timeliness ranking, and it is not clear that one can “beat the market” once transactions 
costs are taken into account, Value Line’s record is impressive. As Choi (2000) notes, it has captured the 
imagination of the finance community like few others. 
 In addition to its timeliness rank, Value Line publishes a large amount of information in its 
quarterly stock reports that may be useful to investors. In particular, once every quarter, for each stock, 
Value Line reports 3-5 year projections for annual total return, sales per share, earnings per share, 
dividends per share and historical data for these measures.1 Unlike virtually all previous studies, which 
focus on the timeliness ranks, our study concentrates on Value Line’s long-term projections. In the spirit 
of past studies using timeliness ranks, we examine whether Value Line's 3-5 year projections for common 
stock returns, earnings, sales, profit margins or earnings yields have predictive power with regard to 
realized values over that horizon, e.g. whether purchasing stocks with higher predicted returns would 
really enable investors to earn higher realized returns, or if firms with higher predicted growth in earnings 
per share actually do exhibit higher earnings growth ex-post than firms with lower predicted growth. 
Furthermore, because many previous studies of analyst forecasts have focused on forecast bias, we also 
                                                 
1
 Current Value Line reports for each of the 30 stocks comprising the Dow Jones Industrial Average can be freely 
accessed even by non-subscribers at http://www.valueline.com. A brief perusal reveals the enormous range of 
information these reports contain beyond the timeliness rank that has been the focus of most prior studies. 
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examine whether Value Line's 3-5 year projections exhibit significant bias, i.e. whether mean predicted 
values for stock returns, earnings, etc. differ from mean realized values.   
 Beyond the fact that Value Line’s long-term projections have received little past scrutiny, our 
study is motivated by three broader considerations. First, while at least dozens of studies have examined 
various aspects of analysts' short-term (under one year horizon) earnings and stock price forecasts, 
surprisingly little research has been conducted concerning longer horizon projections. La Porta (1996) 
sorts stocks into portfolios based on analysts' five-year earnings projections. He finds that stocks with low 
expected earnings growth earn considerably higher returns, ex-post, than those with high expected 
growth, partly because analysts subsequently revise earnings forecasts upward for stocks with low 
expected earnings growth (and vice-versa). Dechow and Sloan (1997) find that analysts' five-year 
earnings projections are biased upward in general, and that stock prices appear to naively reflect these 
biased forecasts.2 Our study, which uses a long sample period and examines the record of an independent 
advisory service, may shed further light on whether (and if so, why) analyst forecasts are biased. 
 The second motivation for our study arises from the extensive debate about why Value Line’s 
record has been so impressive when compared with those of other security analysts. Several recent 
studies, notably Desai and Jain (1995), Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2001, 2003) have 
examined security analyst recommendations, and report some evidence that purchasing stocks with the 
most favorable consensus recommendations (and/or selling short stocks with the least favorable ratings) 
yield abnormal returns. However, these returns are generally not as large as has been documented for 
portfolios constructed from Value Line rankings, and the performance of the analysts varies greatly over 
time (for example, relative to the market as a whole, their buy recommendations performed extremely 
                                                 
2
 Among studies investigating short-term analyst forecasts, results regarding bias vary depending on the time period 
and variable examined; for example, Brown, Foster and Noreen (1985), along with O'Brien (1988) find no 
compelling evidence of bias in security analyst earnings forecasts over their 1976-1980 and 1975-1981 
(respectively) sample periods, while Butler and Lang (1991) show analysts were sharply overoptimistic in predicting 
earnings between 1983 and 1986, and Easterwood and Nutt (1999) report similar evidence for the period 1982-1995.  
More recently, Agrawal and Chen (2005) find little evidence of systematic bias in earnings forecasts between 1994 
and 2003, but Bradshaw and Brown (2005) document substantial overoptimism in 12-month horizon target stock 
price predictions over their 1997-2002 sample period, and Mikhail, Asquith and Au (2003) find that the probability 
of achieving a 12-month price target is inversely related to the favorability of an analyst's recommendation. 
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poorly in 2000 and 2001, while their sell recommendations handily outperformed the market). One 
possible reason Value Line’s record stands out is that Value Line, being an independent subscription 
service, is not beholden to the firms whose stocks it covers. In contrast, most analysts are employed by 
investment banks that are dependent on client firms for business. These analysts are notoriously reluctant 
to issue sell recommendations, and their buy recommendations may depend more on self-interest than on 
objective analysis of a firm’s prospects. Moreover, as Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006) show, 
analysts’ over-optimism is systematically related to corporate financing activities: over-optimism is 
greatest for firms issuing securities and smallest for firms repurchasing securities. However, an alternative 
possible reason for Value Line’s superior record that has been suggested by many (see, for example, 
Gregory 1983) is that this record is a product of luck. If a large number of independent advisory services 
exist and Value Line is the only one that has managed to outperform the market substantially ex-post, 
then this finding is unsurprising in a statistical sense and does not necessarily imply that markets are 
inefficient. Finally, some studies suggest that Value Line’s timeliness rankings are highly correlated with 
other known anomalies such as post-earnings announcement drift (Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall, 1992) 
and that Value Line’s record is an artifact of this alignment.3 By examining Value Line’s long-term return 
predictions, we believe we can contribute towards a resolution of this debate. If it turns out that Value 
Line’s long term predictions perform as well as their short-term predictions, this would support the 
argument that Value Line’s forecasts are inherently of high quality. Conversely, finding that Value Line’s 
long-term prediction record is not good would suggest that the performance of its timeliness ranks might 
be a product of data mining or alignment with other anomalies. 
 The third important motivation for our study is that Value Line’s 3-5 year return projections 
have been extensively used to estimate the cost of equity capital, and to test asset pricing models in ex-
ante (rather than the traditional ex-post) form. The performance of these projections is therefore an 
                                                 
3
 Some studies have claimed, however, that information contained in Value Line reports can move the market in 
ways that cannot be completely explained by post-earnings announcement drift. For example, Peterson (1987) 
documents that initial reviews of stocks in Value Line generate abnormal returns around a three-day window 
surrounding publication; Peterson (1995) shows that post-earnings announcement drift does not fully explain 
abnormal returns around publication of stock highlights in Value Line. 
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important issue in its own right. Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002, 2005) and Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson and Schipper (2004) have all used Value Line 3-5 year projected stock returns as proxies for the 
cost of equity capital. Ang and Peterson (1985) use ex-ante data from Value Line to investigate the 
relation between expected stock returns and dividend yield. Similarly, in an interesting recent paper, Brav, 
Lehavy and Michaely (2005) use Value Line 3-5 year predicted returns as a proxy for consensus expected 
returns. Unlike prior studies (e.g. Fama and French 1992) using realized returns, Brav, Lehavy and 
Michaely find a robust positive relation between Value Line’s expected returns and market beta, a 
negative relation between expected return and firm size, and no significant relation between expected 
return and book-to-market. However, none of these studies explores the relation between Value Line’s 
predictions and future realized returns. The sharp disparity in results obtained when the cost of capital is 
estimated using Value Line predicted returns vis-à-vis other approaches, and when asset-pricing models 
are tested with these predicted returns instead of realized returns, both underscore the need to examine 
how Value Line predicted returns and realized returns are related. 
 The balance of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we describe the two datasets we 
construct from the Value Line surveys and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database in 
order to examine how well Value Line's 3-5 year forecasts predict subsequently realized values. 
Descriptions of our basic empirical tests and results are provided in Section II, while robustness tests are 
reported in Section III. Section IV concludes the paper. 
 
I. Dataset Construction 
 The study uses data collected from the Value Line Investment Survey once every four years 
beginning in the third quarter of 1969 and ending with the third quarter of 1997. The publication dates of 
the Value Line surveys we sample are between July 1 and September 30 of 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1985, 
1989, 1993 and 1997. For each of these periods we collect data for the 65 Stocks included in the Dow 
Jones Indexes at that time (30 Industrials, 20 Transports and 15 Utilities), providing us (potentially) with 
520 pairs of predicted and realized values for each of the variables we study. We thus focus on eight non-
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overlapping, approximately four-year periods for the following: common stock return (r48), percent 
change in split-adjusted earnings per share (PCEPS), percent change in split-adjusted sales per share 
(PCSPS), change in profit margin (DPM), and change in earnings yield (DEY).4 In order to construct both 
predicted and realized values for these variables, and to provide us with necessary controls, for each firm-
year we collect the following information from Value Line: current stock price and estimated book value 
per share, number of common shares outstanding, low and high 3-5 year predicted target prices, Value 
Line’s estimated beta, (split-adjusted) sales, earnings and dividends per share for each firm for the eighth, 
fourth and first years prior to the publication year, and Value Line’s sales, earnings and dividends per 
share forecasts for the publication year and for 3-5 years in the future.5 
 We interpret Value Line’s 3-5 year horizon projections as 4-year predictions. This interpretation 
is merely an approximation. For example, a Value Line report dated August 15, 1997 will contain a high 
and low projected stock price for the 2000-2002 period. To estimate the "4-year horizon" predicted annual 
return, we first compute a dividend growth rate as g = (DIV2000-2002 / DIV1997).25 – 1, where DIV is Value 
Line’s predicted dividend per share. Next, we project yearly cash flows over a four year period by 
assuming the estimated publication year dividend grows at the rate of g each year, and by assuming the 
stock is sold at the average of the high and low target prices taken from Value Line. 6  Finally, we define 
the Value Line predicted annual return (VLR48t) as the internal rate of return earned by buying the stock 
at the “recent stock price” recorded in the Value Line survey and by receiving the cash flows constructed 
in the previous step. The reason the presumed 4-year forecast horizon is only approximate is that the 
midpoint of the 2000-2002 range is June 30, 2001; if the report containing the projection is dated August 
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 Here and throughout the study a "pc" prefix in a variable name indicates a percentage change, and a"d" prefix a 
first difference. 
 
5
 Value Line does not provide annual forecasts of sales, earnings and dividends per share; rather, a single point 
forecast is provided for 3-5 years in the future. For example, in a Value Line Investment Survey stock report from 
the third quarter of 1997, figures are provided for 1997, 1998 and 2000-2002. As explained below, we would 
interpret the 2000-2002 projection in this case as a 4-year horizon forecast. 
 
6
 Our use of the average of the high and low prices as an implicit point forecast for the future stock price is 
consistent with Value Line's (2000, p.24) definition of the target price range. The guide explicitly states that "the 
midpoint of the range is our estimate of the average annual price three to five years from now." 
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15, 1997 then in this case the actual forecast horizon would be only 3 years and 10.5 months. This degree 
of shortfall would be fairly typical, given that the Value Line reports we sample are all dated between 
July 1 and September 30. Similar considerations prevail regarding the horizons of the sales, earnings, 
profit margin and earnings yield forecasts of companies that report results for calendar years. For 
financial statement-based variables, the horizon discrepancies may be greater in the case of a minority of 
firms whose fiscal years do not coincide with calendar years.7 
 From CRSP, we match monthly realized returns for up to 48 months prior, and 48 months 
subsequent to the last trading day of September for each firm and publication year in the study to the 
Value Line data. There were relatively few instances where we could not obtain at least a four-year 
returns history for the stocks in this dataset. More frequently, however, due to mergers and the occasional 
bankruptcy, we could not obtain post-forecast returns from CRSP for a full 4-year period. Because we 
wished to avoid selection bias, we retained such stocks in the study. The CRSP returns we used included 
partial month delisting returns; in subsequent months, when we could not obtain a return from CRSP, we 
substituted the CRSP value-weighted portfolio return for the missing return on the individual stock. For 
each stock, the actual realized return is defined as 
    ( ) ,1148
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++
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where R48it,t+48 is the annual average realized return on stock i from the end of publication month t to 
month t+48, and rit+k is the actual return on stock i in month t+k.8 
 Financial statement data presents several distinct challenges not encountered with stock returns. 
Value Line reports historical and projected earnings per share before extraordinary items; nevertheless, 
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 Stock return forecasts are not affected if fiscal and calendar years differ, because dividend and target stock price 
projections in Value Line are always for calendar years. In addition, as explained below, we obtain realized values 
for sales and earnings from future issues of Value Line, insuring that even when the true horizon differs from 4 
years, the horizons are always the same for predicted and actual values. 
 
8
 In constructing the realized return, the publication month is considered to be September even if the actual stock 
report from which we obtained data from Value Line was published in July or August. 
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earnings are sometimes negative, and a percent change can be calculated only if EPS is positive in the 
base year. We cannot use an annual growth rate in earnings because such a calculation would further 
require that EPS be positive at the horizon date (thus forcing us to drop observations where this criterion 
is not met). Furthermore, no proxy for actual earnings can be obtained for firms that do not survive four 
years after the forecast date (due to either merger or bankruptcy). Finally, unlike stock prices, earnings are 
available only with a considerable lag. Consequently, during the July-September period each year when 
EPS data is obtained from Value Line, only the previous year’s actual earnings are known. 
 In light of these difficulties, we focus on the total percent change in earnings over an approximate 
4-year horizon. Value Line's predicted percent change in earnings per share is defined as 
  ,
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Where VLEPSi,t+4 is Value Line's predicted EPS for 3-5 calendar years after the publication date for firm 
i, and EPSi,t-1 is the EPS for firm i in year t-1 (the latest known annual EPS at the time the Value Line 
report is published). We construct a matching actual total percent change in earnings per share as   
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Where EPSi,t+n is the split-adjusted EPS for firm i in year t+n, as reported in Value Line six years after the 
year in which the forecasted earnings were obtained. We use an average of earnings per share in years t+3 
to t+5 to reduce cyclical fluctuations and to match Value Line's stated 3-5 year forecast horizon.9  
 The predicted and actual percent change in sales per share are calculated similarly to their 
earnings counterparts. We define profit margin (PM) as the (Value Line definitions of) earnings per share 
divided by sales per share. We then calculate the predicted and actual change in profit margin as 
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 Following some previous studies, we also calculate an alternative definition of earnings, DEPSP, defined as the 
split-adjusted change in EPS (average of years t+3 to t+5 minus year t-1) divided by the initial stock price at the 
time the EPS forecast is made. Results for this alternative definition are reported in a separate robustness section. 
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Where VLPMit,t+4 is Value line's predicted profit margin for firm i 3-5 years after the publication year, and 
PM for years t+3 through t+5 are taken from future issues of Value Line. Predicted and actual changes in 
the earnings yield, respectively, are calculated as 
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Where EYi,t is the forecasted EPS for the publication year divided by the current stock price as reported in 
Value Line, VLEYi,t+4 is the forecast EPS for 3-5 years after publication divided by the average of the 
high and low predicted 3-5 year horizon stock prices, and EYi,t+n is the actual EPS for firm i, year n as 
reported in future issues of Value Line divided by the average annual stock price as reported by CRSP.10 
 Although useful, the Dow dataset has one substantial limitation. Because all of the Dow stocks 
are large and actively traded, with extensive analyst following, investors would incur relatively lower 
transactions costs in trading them, and the pricing of these stocks may be more efficient than the typical 
stock that Value Line follows. To ensure that at least those findings in our study pertaining to stock 
returns are not primarily driven by the subset of stocks we analyze, we construct a second dataset. Each 
week, Value Line publishes a summary that contains a table of the top 100 stocks ranked by appreciation 
potential over a 3-5 year horizon. We sample this table every four years on the final week of September 
starting in 1969 and ending in 1997. From the table, we obtain the recent stock price, predicted total 
appreciation, and Value Line’s timeliness and safety ranks, and we match return data from CRSP for up 
to 48 months prior, and 48 months subsequent to the last trading day of September.11  
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 For a small number of firms, we were able to obtain financial statement information for four (but not five) post-
publication years. In these cases, rather than drop the observations from the sample, we used only the fourth post-
publication year (rather than an average of years t+3 to t+5) in calculating actual earnings, sales, etc. 
11 As before, when we could not obtain post-publication returns for a stock from CRSP for a full 4-year period, we 
include partial month delisting returns. However, unlike in the case of the Dow dataset, because we perform only 
portfolio tests for these top 100 firms, we substitute the average of the remaining firms’ returns for the missing 
firm’s returns in subsequent months. Otherwise, we construct average annual realized returns in this dataset in 
exactly the same way as for the Dow stocks.  
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II. Tests for Unbiasedness and Predictive Power of Value Line Forecasts 
 Descriptive statistics for predicted and actual (realized) values for the Dow dataset are reported in 
Table 1, wherein we report the number of observations, means, standard deviations and various points 
along the distribution. In the table, we report similar statistics for control variables used in our study. For 
ease of exposition, we multiply most variables by 100, i.e. we report percentages as whole numbers. We 
were forced to drop one observation from the sample for predicted and realized stock returns (Penn 
Central in 1973, for which Value Line did not supply target stock prices), leaving us 519 matching paired 
observations for VLR48 and R48. For other variables, as explained previously, more observations had to 
be dropped (this was particularly true in the case of VLPCEPS and PCEPS, where EPS in year t-1 had to 
be positive for the figures to be meaningful); consequently, for financial statement-based variables, 
number of observations ranges from 434 for PCEPS to 453 for DEPSP. Apart from the large differences 
in means between many of the Value Line predictions and their matching realized values, examined in 
much greater depth in Table 2 below, the most striking aspects of the distributions in Table 1 are the 
extreme values observed for some variables. For example, while the mean for PCEPS (total percent 
change in earnings over an approximately 4-year horizon) is 31.46, the minimum is -545.07 and the 
maximum 3,122.22.12 This aspect of the distributions cautions us to test whether our major findings still 
hold if extreme values are removed, which we do in a separate robustness section below. 
< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE > 
 Formal tests of Value Line forecast bias are reported in Table 2. Mean predicted and subsequently 
realized four-year horizon stock returns, broken down by cohort year, are reported in Panel A. These 
results show that Value Line’s analysts have been incredibly overoptimistic in predicting future returns 
for the Dow stocks in our sample period, insofar as the mean predicted annual return (20.255%) has been 
almost twice the mean realized return (10.173%), with a t-statistic for the difference in means of 12.966. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
12
 Because PCEPS measures the total percent change in EPS, and EPS can be negative, it is possible for PCEPS to 
be less than -100%. For example, if a firm has an EPS of $1 in year t-1, and average EPS for years t+3 to t+5 were  
-$2, then PCEPS would equal -300%. 
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Indeed, in six of the eight cohort years, the mean predicted return greatly exceeds the mean realized 
return, and t-tests reject the equality of the two measures at better than 1%. 
< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE > 
 Evidence concerning the unbiasedness of Value Line’s earnings, sales, profit margin and earnings 
yield forecasts is provided in Panels B through E of Table 2. The EPS and profit margin projections are 
strikingly overoptimistic on average. The null hypothesis that predicted and actual values overall are 
equal is rejected at any conventional level for these variables. Indeed, for both EPS in panel B and profit 
margin in Panel D, predicted values are larger than realized values for every single cohort year, and the 
forecast error is significantly positive in a large majority of cohort years. In sharp contrast, Value Line 
appears to be considerably less biased when predicting sales or earnings yields. For sales overall, we 
cannot reject the null that the predicted and actual values are equal. In the case of earnings yields, Value 
Line's analysts have actually been slightly too pessimistic, as the mean predicted decline in EY has been 
significantly smaller (at the 5% level) than the mean actual decline. As EY is simply the reciprocal of the 
P/E ratio, this indicates stock valuations have risen relative to earnings more than Value Line predicted.13 
 Taking a bottom-up view, the overall tenor of the results in Table 2 strongly indicates that the key 
variable is profit margin. Because Value Line's analysts consistently overpredict the profit margin, their 
earnings forecasts also tend to be too high despite the fact that their sales forecasts appear unbiased. The 
grossly inflated earnings forecasts, in turn, produce inflated stock return predictions despite the apparent 
pessimism with regard to valuations. If one takes a top-down view, however, Value Line’s overoptimism 
                                                 
13
 Like their sales projections, Value Line’s economic projections do not appear to have been systematically biased 
for the most part. Every issue of Value Line contains a statement of the hypothesized economic environment 3-5 
years in the future, with detailed annual projections for nominal and real GDP, industrial production and a few other 
variables. We collected these “forecasts” (Value Line does not formally characterize them as such) every four years 
and compared them with actual realizations for the annual percent change in real GDP, industrial production and the 
GDP deflator. These results (not reported) showed that while Value Line’s economic predictions are often wide of 
the mark, there generally is no strong bias in these predictions on average. The mean predicted annual growth in real 
GDP was 3.42%, which is only slightly above mean actual growth of 3.22%. Similarly, the mean predicted inflation 
rate (4.10%) was only slightly below the mean actual inflation rate (4.44%). The only economic variable for which 
Value Line appears to have been systematically overoptimistic is industrial production: here Value Line’s mean 
annual growth prediction overall (4.26%) was well above actual growth (2.80%), and the predicted growth rate 
exceeded the actual for seven of the eight 4-year periods we examined.  
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with respect to future returns is difficult to understand, because the ex-post performance of the stock 
market as a whole over the period 1969 - 2001, and the performance of the Dow stocks, has not been out 
of line when compared with longer historical periods.14 Finally, we note that mean VL predicted returns 
for the Dow stocks are very similar to mean VL predicted returns on a much broader cross-section of 
stocks, as can be seen by closely comparing our results in Table 2, by cohort year, to those in Francis et. 
al. (2004, Table 2). Thus, it is unlikely that Value Line's overoptimism is confined to the Dow stocks. 
 We next examine whether Value Line's long-term forecasts of stock returns, earnings, sales, 
profit margins and earnings yields have power to predict realized values of these variables in a cross-
sectional sense, e.g. do firms for which Value Line predicts relatively greater stock returns actually 
perform better than firms for which Value Line predicts lower returns? To examine predictive power, we 
begin by modeling the simple relation between predicted and realized values in a regression framework. 
While our dataset is primarily cross-sectional, it does have a subtle time series component, and Value 
Line’s long-term forecasts might therefore conceivably have power to predict realized values in two 
ways. First, as already shown in Table 2 Panel A, Value Line’s aggregate predicted return for the 
“market” (as proxied by the Dow stocks) is time-varying. Similarly, predicted aggregate changes in 
earnings, profit margins and earnings yields vary substantially based on the cohort year, and might 
forecast subsequent aggregate realized values. Second, Value Line’s analysts might have purely cross-
sectional predictive power, i.e. they may successfully predict which stocks will outperform others over a 
given time period, or which firms will experience rapid earnings growth relative to other firms. Because 
time-varying market expected returns are generally considered consistent with efficiency, our primary 
interest lies in the second, purely cross-sectional component of Value Line’s predictive power.  
                                                 
14
 Between September 1969 and September 2001, the geometric mean annual return on an equally weighted 
portfolio of the 65 Dow stocks was about 9.9% in nominal terms, or 5.3% in real terms using the GDP deflator to 
measure inflation. Over the same period, the CRSP value weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ portfolio returned 
11.1% per annum in nominal terms and 6.4% in real terms. Both of these measures are roughly in accord with 
geometric average long-run returns for U.S. stocks reported in Siegel (1998), which are 8.4% per annum in nominal 
terms (7.0% in real terms) over the 1802-1997 period. 
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 We examine the relations between predicted and realized values both with and without 
controlling for the time series component using the following regressions: 
    Realized Value  =  α + β (VL Prediction) + eit,                                  (6) 
Realized Value  =  α1D69 + α2D73 + α3D77 + α4D81 + α5D85 + α6D89 + α7D93 + α8D97 + β (VL Prediction) + eit,   (7) 
Where D69…D97 are 0,1 dummy variables representing the cohort year of the Value Line forecast. Here 
and in other regression tests in the study, we use the White (1980) correction to ensure that our estimated 
coefficient standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity in the residuals.15 We interpret the slope 
coefficient from model (6) as a measure of the total predictive power of the Value Line forecasts, and the 
coefficient β from regression (7) as measuring only the cross-sectional component of Value Line’s 
predictive ability. If these coefficients are significantly positive, then the Value Line forecasts can be 
interpreted as having predictive power.  
< INSERT  TABLE  3  HERE > 
 The results from estimating models (6) and (7) are provided in Table 3, panels A and B, 
respectively. As one might expect based on the efficient markets hypothesis, the results vary depending 
on the forecasted variable. For stock returns, there is no evidence that Value Line has any predictive 
power. The slope coefficient in Panel A, while positive, is very small and indistinguishable from zero; the 
slope coefficient in panel B is actually marginally significant and negative, indicating that stocks for 
which Value Line predicts relatively high appreciation in a given cohort year actually tend to do worse 
than stocks for which they predict lower appreciation. For earnings, sales, profit margins and earnings 
yields, our results are more favorable to Value Line. Regardless of whether we do (panel B) or do not 
(panel A) control for time-series components, the slope coefficients for all of these variables are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating that Value Line's analysts do have predictive power 
over an approximately 4-year horizon vis-à-vis these variables. In both panels of Table 3, we also test the 
hypothesis that the slope coefficients equal one. A slope that is positive but significantly below one would 
                                                 
15
 Our error terms are not serially correlated given the largely cross-sectional nature of the dataset, and the fact that 
we do not use overlapping data. 
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be in accordance with LaPorta's (1996) finding that analysts' growth expectations are too extreme. 
Clearly, our findings for earnings, sales and profit margins support this interpretation, as in both panels 
the slopes for these variables are significantly less than one. We do find, however, that Value Line's 
earnings yield forecasts are not extreme, because for this variable the slopes are very close to one.16 
 For stock prices (but not for other variables, for which only single point forecasts are provided), 
Value Line reports 3-5 year projected high and low prices. As explained earlier, we use the mean of these 
price projections (combined with forecasted dividends) to compute 4-year horizon projected stock returns. 
We now use these same high-low price projections to measure forecast uncertainty, and to determine 
whether the bias and predictive power of Value Line's stock return forecasts is related to this uncertainty. 
We define Value Line Forecast Uncertainty (VLFU) as (Phigh - Plow) / 0.5(Phigh + Plow), where Phigh and Plow 
are, respectively, Value Line's 3-5 year projected high and low stock prices. We normalize the uncertainty 
variable by dividing each firm's result by the average calculated uncertainty of all Dow stocks in the same 
cohort year. Thus, firms with VLFU exceeding one have above average forecast uncertainty relative to all 
Dow stocks in a given year, and vice-versa. We then sort firms into quintiles based on VLFU, and 
examine whether stock return forecast bias and predictive power varies across these quintiles using the 
same procedures used previously.17  
< INSERT  TABLE  4  HERE > 
 The forecast uncertainty findings are reported in Table 4. It appears from the results in Panel A 
that Value Line's positive forecast bias increases with forecast uncertainty: the mean difference between 
predicted and actual annual stock return increases from 5.685% for firms in the lowest VLFU quintile to 
16.09% for firms in the highest quintile. We note, however, that a significant positive forecast bias 
                                                 
16
 The R2 statistics reported in Table 3, Panel B for model (7) should be interpreted with caution. While they are 
uniformly higher than for model (6), R2 in this context is an ex-post measure and does not indicate greater ex-ante 
predictability using model (7). We believe the slope coefficients in the two models are comparable, and these 
generally do not indicate greater predictability with model (7). 
 
17
 We are unable to calculate VLFU for the 1969 cohort because Value Line provides only a single point forecast for 
the 3-5 year horizon stock price in its Investment Survey issues in that year. We thank an anynomous referee for 
suggesting that we examine if stock return forecast bias and predictive power are related to forecast uncertainty. 
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remains across all of the quintiles. The regression tests for predictive power, sorted by VLFU quintile,  
are reported in Panel B. While the slope coefficients do appear to vary across quintiles, and are 
significantly positive in three cases, the results fail to conclusively demonstrate that predictive power and 
VLFU are related, because the slope is actually highest for the fourth VLFU quintile.18 
 To gain further insight into how Value Line's predicted and realized values are related, as well as 
into how Value Line's predictions for different variables for the same firm are linked, we next examine 
how predicted and realized values differ across portfolios that are formed based on (ex-ante) Value Line 
predictions. These results are reported in Table 5, wherein we form portfolios based on quintiles of 
VLR48 (Value Line predicted stock returns) in Panel A, VLPCEPS (predicted % change in EPS) in Panel 
B and VLDPM (predicted change in profit margin) in Panel C. For each quintile resulting from each of 
these three sorts, we report the mean annual realized stock return over the subsequent 48 months (R48), 
the mean realized stock return orthogonal to market capitalization, book-to-market, past 4-year stock 
return, and beta (ORTHR48), the mean Value Line predicted stock return (VLR48), the realized % 
change in EPS (PCEPS), the predicted % change in EPS (VLPCEPS), the realized change in profit 
margin (DPM) and the predicted change in profit margin (VLDPM). By forming portfolios every four 
years and reporting average results across eight cohorts, we deliberately remove any impact of time series 
predictability in returns; thus, our portfolio tests should closely complement the regressions with dummy 
variables approach in Table 3 Panel B. 
<  INSERT TABLE 5 HERE  > 
 If Value Line has predictive power with respect to stock returns, then we would expect that the 
portfolio composed of the top 20% of firms each cohort year ranked on the basis of VLR48 (p5 in Panel 
A) would have higher R48 than the portfolio composed of the bottom 20% of firms (p1). Consistent with 
the regression tests of predictive power in Table 3, however, we find that this is not the case: the mean p5 
stock returns are actually lower than the mean p1 stock returns. If realized stock returns are adjusted to 
                                                 
18
 The regressions in Table 4, Panel B were also estimated using a variant of Model 7, in which the constant term is 
allowed to vary by cohort year. While some of the estimated slope coefficients were quite different, the evidence 
regarding a clear relation between the slope coefficients and VLFU remained inconclusive. 
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make them orthogonal to factors that prior research has shown to affect cross-sectional returns, then there 
is virtually no difference in the realized adjusted returns between p5 and p1. Two other results in Panel A 
are worth noting. First, Value Line overpredicts stock returns, on average, for all five quintiles, thus 
underscoring the pervasive optimistic bias of the Value Line stock return projections. Second, the results 
demonstrate internal consistency in the form of a positive relation, at the firm level, across the set of 
Value Line predictions: firms that are predicted to experience higher stock returns are also predicted to 
have higher earnings growth and larger profit margin increases. For example, mean VLPCEPS for p5 
firms with high VLR48 is 189.37%, while mean VLPCEPS for p1 firms with low VLR48 is only 54.23%.  
 The results for portfolios sorted based on predicted earnings (Panel B) and predicted profit 
margin (Panel C) confirm earlier regression findings that Value Line does have some power to predict 
(approximately) 4-year horizon changes in these variables. For example, in Panel B, the realized % 
change in EPS for the lowest prediction quintile is -3.30%, vs. 90.65% for the highest quintile. Similarly, 
in Panel C, the realized change in profit margin for the lowest quintile is -2.75, vs. +1.01 for the highest 
quintile. We also confirm earlier findings that Value Line analysts are uniformly overoptimistic: for all 
quintiles the realized change in EPS or profit margin is lower than the predicted change. Finally, the 
results continue to show internal consistency, in that firms with higher VLPCEPS  or VLDPM also tend 
to have higher predicted stock returns, albeit not by large margins.19 
 
III. Robustness Tests 
 As an initial measure of the robustness of our basic findings regarding unbiasedness and 
predictive power, we test whether these findings are sensitive to outliers. These results are reported in 
Panel A of Table 6. Here we repeat some of the tests conducted in Tables 2 and 3, except that the extreme 
5% of observations of the realized values (2.5% in each tail), along with firm-matched Value Line 
predicted values, are trimmed. As regards bias, for the stock returns, earnings and profit margins, the 
                                                 
19
 We also examined the internal consistency of Value Line's forecasts by running cross-sectional regressions of 
forecast errors for each variable on forecast errors for other variables. These results confirm the finding that forecast 
errors across firms for stock returns, earnings and profit margins are significantly positively related to each other. 
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overall trimmed results are very similar to the untrimmed and confirm that Value Line has grossly 
overpredicted these variables on average. For sales, the trimmed results show a slight tendency to 
overpredict (forecast error significantly positive at the 5% level), whereas the untrimmed results did not. 
Conversely, for earnings yields, the trimmed results show no significant difference between the means of 
the actual and predicted values, whereas the untrimmed results indicated that Value Line was slightly too 
conservative in predicting earnings yields.  
<  INSERT TABLE 6 HERE  > 
 We also report simple tests for predictive power with the trimmed data in Table 6, Panel A. For 
brevity, we only report trimmed results without cohort year dummy variables, but the conclusions are 
unchanged when the latter are included. For stock returns, sales and profit margins, the regressions 
estimated with trimmed data yield very similar conclusions to those estimated with untrimmed data (as 
reported in Table 3, Panel A), although the slope coefficient in Table 6 is 0.0929 in the case of stock 
returns and is marginally significant. Some interesting differences do emerge, however, for the remaining 
variables. For earnings, using the trimmed data, the slope is very nearly zero and insignificant, indicating 
that in non-extreme cases Value Line has no predictive power with respect to earnings growth. Similarly, 
we find that Value Line's predictive power with respect to earnings yields is notably lower with the 
trimmed data than with the untrimmed, albeit in this case some degree of predictive power may remain. 
 We further examine the robustness of our findings by repeating our basic tests using alternative 
variable definitions, focusing on what we consider the two most important variables. We create an 
orthogonal stock return by taking the constant term plus the residual from a regression of (respectively) 
R48 and VLR48 on relative market capitalization, book-to-market, stock return over the prior 48 months, 
and beta as reported in Value Line, with all independent variables in deviation from the mean form. We 
use these variables because previous studies, e.g. DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and Fama and French 
(1992), suggest they are important determinants of the cross-section of stock returns, and we want to 
ascertain if Value Line's stock return predictions have any value beyond what can be explained by these 
measures. As shown in Panel B of Table 6, neither unbiasedness nor predictive power using orthogonal 
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stock returns are markedly different than when unadjusted returns are used; the severe optimistic bias and 
lack of evidence of predictive power remain evident in the case of the orthogonal returns.  
 In many previous studies of analyst forecasts, earnings changes are normalized by dividing both 
predicted and realized earnings per share by the initial stock price. To see if our results are sensitive to 
this normalization, we reran our basic tests using this alternative measure of earnings, defined in footnote 
9. We find (Table 6, Panel B) that Value Line's earnings forecasts remain grossly overoptimistic, as the 
forecast error (predicted - realized) is large and significantly positive at any conventional level.20 
However, unlike with the simpler definition of earnings change used in Table 3, we now find no evidence 
of predictive power: the slope coefficient in a regression of realized values on predicted values (albeit 
positive) is insignificantly different from zero. Clearly, therefore, one important conclusion that emerges 
from Table 6 is that Value Line's ability to predict earnings across this cross-section of firms depends 
crucially on how the earnings change variable is defined. Results are much less favorable to Value Line 
when outliers are trimmed or when earnings changes are normalized by the current stock price.21 
 Another issue which arises with respect to earnings is the treatment of extraordinary (non-
recurring) gains and losses. Value Line excludes these items from its historical and forecast EPS tables, 
but provides the total amounts, by year, in footnotes to its stock reports. Because Value Line only 
provides forecasts for EPS excluding extraordinary items, we believed it best to exclude these items in all 
of the tests reported in this study. However, to ascertain if our results are sensitive to this treatment, we 
randomly selected 50 stock reports and repeated the tests reported in Table 2 and Table 3, Panel A for 
percent change in EPS, change in profit margin, and change in earnings yield, where the earnings were 
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 Note that DEPSP (change in earnings as a percent of stock price) and DEY (change in earnings yield) differ. 
When computing the earnings yield in year t+4, the average of  realized earnings per share in years t+3 to t+5 is 
divided by the stock price in year t+4 rather than by the stock price in year t. 
 
21
 We also examined Value Line forecast bias and predictive power broken down by type of firm (industrial, 
transport or utility). These results (available from the authors on request) showed that firm type did not matter in 
evaluating forecast bias: Value Line's stock return, earnings and profit margin forecasts were significantly optimistic 
for all classifications. However, for reasons we cannot fully explain, Value Line did appear to have significant 
predictive power vis-à-vis utility stock returns, even though their record in forecasting earnings and profit margins 
for utilities is no better than for other types of firms. 
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defined as alternately including and excluding extraordinary items. These results (not reported) show that 
the findings we report in this paper are not highly sensitive to this choice.22  
 All of the results we have presented thus far are for the Dow dataset. As discussed earlier, one 
potentially severe limitation is that the included stocks are not representative of the typical stock Value 
Line covers. To ascertain if our stock return prediction results for the Dow stocks are likely to hold for a 
broader cross-section, we conduct portfolio tests for the “top 100” database, described earlier. These test 
results are reported in Table 7. Specifically, we form portfolios every 4 years beginning September 30, 
1969 based on Value Line’s listing of the top 100 stocks by appreciation potential (these stocks have the 
greatest predicted total returns over a 3-5 year horizon). The “All Top 100 Stocks” column is for an 
equally weighted portfolio holding all stocks on the list. The safety rank = 1,2,3, safety rank=4, and safety 
rank=5 portfolios, respectively, contain stocks on the top 100 list with the indicated safety ranks, and the 
timeliness rank =1,2,3 portfolio contains stocks on the top 100 list with a timeliness rank of 3 or better.23 
Finally, the "top 33" portfolio is an equally weighted combination of the top one-third of stocks (ranked 
by predicted return) on the top 100 list. We estimate time series regressions of the portfolio excess returns 
against  various combinations of factors shown in previous studies (e.g. Fama and French 1992, and 
Carhart 1997) to be strongly related to realized stock returns.24 
< INSERT  TABLE  7  HERE > 
                                                 
22
 If anything, the positive bias in predicted PCEPS and DPM is actually larger when extraordinary items are 
included in historical and realized EPS, probably because these items are more often negative than positive. As 
regards predictive power, our results for the randomly selected subsample indicate less ability by Value Line to 
predict changes in earnings and profit margins (compared to the full sample) regardless of whether extraordinary 
items are included in EPS; there is no marked difference in predictive power with respect to including or excluding 
these items, other things held constant. 
 
23
 Value Line defines its safety rank as a measurement of potential risk associated with an individual stock. The 
Safety Rank is computed by averaging two other Value Line indexes—the Price Stability Index and the Financial 
Strength Rating. Safety Ranks range from 1 (Highest) to 5 (Lowest). 
 
24
 The factors are ERM (market return less T-Bill return), SMB (excess return on small cap stocks relative to large 
cap), HML (excess return on high book-to-market relative to low book-to-market stocks) and UMD (excess return 
on stocks with high return momentum relative to those with low momentum). All of the factors, along with the 
monthly T-bill returns used to construct the excess portfolio returns, were downloaded from Kenneth French’s 
website at Dartmouth College. 
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 The results in Table 7 are very easy to summarize. Not one single portfolio we construct from 
stocks on the top 100 list significantly outperformed the market, regardless of the performance evaluation 
model used.25 These results for the top 100 dataset are consistent with the earlier conclusion, based on the 
Dow data, that Value Line demonstrates no predictive power vis-à-vis long run stock returns.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 In sharp contrast to the previously well-documented ability of Value Line timeliness ranks to 
predict future short-run stock performance, we find that Value Line’s long-term stock return projections 
are extremely overoptimistic and have no predictive power. Predicted returns for the Dow stocks have 
averaged 20.3% per annum; this figure is about twice the level of realized returns on these stocks over the 
1969-2001 period, and considerably above the long term average stock market return in the U.S. When 
we regress future realized returns over a 4-year horizon on Value Line’s predicted 3-5 year returns for our 
Dow dataset, we find that the predicted returns are not significantly related to the future realized returns. 
This finding holds regardless of whether we control for time series effects and/or for other factors that 
previous studies have shown to be related to realized returns. 
 We shed additional light on Value Line's poor performance in predicting long-horizon stock 
returns by also examining their forecasts of earnings, sales, profit margins and earnings yields. We note, 
first, that there is a strong degree of consistency across Value Line's forecasts of various measures: Table 
5 shows that firms with higher predicted stock returns also tend to have higher predicted growth in 
earnings and profit margins. It is, therefore, perhaps unsurprising that Value Line’s record forecasting 
earnings changes over 3-5 year horizons is (at best) only marginally better than their stock return 
prediction record. We do find a significant positive cross sectional relation between predicted and actual 
                                                 
25
 When using the Fama and French 3-factor model, we obtain negative alphas for all of the portfolios, and the alpha 
is significantly negative when we restrict it to hold stocks with a Value Line safety rank of 3 or better. The closest 
our results come to economic (if not statistical) significance are the 4-factor alphas for the "all top 100," "timeliness 
rank=1,2,3" and "top 33 stocks." These alphas are all in the range of 0.16-0.31% per month (about 2.0-3.8% 
annualized). However, when we segregate the top 100 stocks by Value Line safety rank, we find that only those with 
safety ranks below 3 appear to have positive 4-factor alphas, indicating that the positive alpha on the top 100 
portfolio is most likely due to unobserved risk factors that are not captured by even the 4-factor model.  
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earnings changes; however, this relation essentially disappears if extreme observations are trimmed from 
the sample or if earnings changes are normalized based on initial stock prices. Moreover, Value Line’s 
earnings projections are even more upwardly biased than their stock return predictions. In contrast to this 
poor performance in predicting earnings, we find little evidence of bias in forecasts of earnings yields, 
and there is even some robust evidence of predictive power with respect to this variable. Consequently, 
our results indicate that Value Line's overoptimism and poor predictive power vis-à-vis stock returns is 
driven primarily by similar problems predicting earnings growth at the firm level, rather than by 
systematic mistakes in forecasts of future valuations as reflected in earnings yields. 
 Because earnings can be further decomposed into sales and profit margins, our examination of 
these predictions yields further insights into why Value Line's earnings and stock return forecasts perform 
so poorly. Value Line's sales predictions exhibit, at most, only a slight degree of upward bias, and there is 
robust evidence that Value Line displays cross-sectional predictive power in forecasting sales. The profit 
margin predictions are strongly upwardly biased, but there is robust evidence that they have predictive 
power as well. Thus, we can conclude that the bias in earnings forecasts appears to be entirely due to the 
extreme upward bias in projected profit margins, but we cannot easily explain the lack of predictive 
power with respect to earnings revealed by the robust tests reported in Table 6. 
 The poor overall record Value Line exhibits in its long-term stock return and earnings forecasts 
supports the view that the spectacular past performance of Value Line’s timeliness indicator likely reflects 
either its close alignment with other known anomalies such as momentum and/or post earnings 
announcement drift, data mining, or some combination of these factors. At a minimum, Value Line's 
long-term forecast record as documented herein should caution investors not to rely mechanically on 
these projections for either stock selection, valuation or planning purposes. Similarly, the extreme upward 
bias and lack of predictive power exhibited by Value Line's stock return projections calls into question the 
common practice of using these predictions as proxies for the cost of equity in cost-of-capital studies, and 
their use as proxies for aggregate ex-ante expected returns in tests of asset pricing models.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
                      Number                            Standard 
Variable        of Obs.         Mean     Deviation      Minimum         P=.05          P=.25        Median         P=.75         P=.95    Maximum 
 
Value Line Four-Year Horizon Predictions 
 
VLR48 519 20.26 10.95 -16.06 5.79 12.88 18.66 26.35 39.68 102.47 
VLPCEPS 434 98.78 214.30 -25.93 15.71 35.26 59.66 92.07 214.50 2703.03 
VLDEPSP    453 8.36 11.24 -5.00 1.58 3.43 5.27 8.34 30.69 118.65 
VLPCSPS 451 45.27 34.97 -65.74 9.47 26.04 39.78 56.80 100.39 398.69 
VLDPM 451 1.22 2.39 -6.81 -1.55 0.02 0.69 1.85 5.70 17.05 
VLDEY 449 -1.54 7.95 -90.42 -9.18 -3.95 -1.28 1.06 5.95 61.17 
 
Realized Values over Four-Year Horizons 
 
R48 519 10.17 14.29 -51.78 -13.41 2.15 10.55 18.70 32.94 57.57 
PCEPS 434 31.46 197.39 -545.07 -145.07 -9.24 24.47 70.90 144.06 3122.22 
DEPSP 453 1.50 16.54 -120.78 -16.98 -0.67 2.10 5.91 16.59 146.27 
PCSPS 451 43.14 58.08 -63.71 -31.47 10.30 37.12 65.03 127.79 626.34 
DPM 451 -0.83 4.07 -18.31 -7.57 -2.56 -0.58 1.06 5.22 24.56 
DEY 449 -4.85 30.21 -415.65 -21.95 -4.03 -0.76 2.37 7.84 38.08 
 
Risk Factors and other Control Variables 
 
RMC 519 1.00 1.69 0.01 0.04 0.20 0.38 0.88 4.12 12.37 
BM 519 0.91 0.62 -2.77 0.20 0.52 0.78 1.14 2.15 3.80 
PR48 511 10.41 12.94 -27.64 -9.22 1.87 10.06 18.10 32.31 57.57 
BETA 514 1.00 0.27 0.32 0.63 0.80 1.00 1.15 1.44 2.46 
VLFU 454 1.00 0.31 0.35 0.55 0.77 0.96 1.22 1.52 2.06 
 
Variables are defined as follows (a "VL" prefix indicates an ex-ante 4-year horizon value line forecast): R48 = average annual realized stock return over 
subsequent 48 months, PCEPS = % change in EPS, DEPSP = change in EPS as a percent of the initial stock price, PCSPS = % change in sales per share, DPM 
= change in profit margin, DEY = change in earnings yield, RMC = relative market capitalization, BM = ratio of book value to market value of common stock, PR48 
= average annual common stock return over prior 48 months, BETA = stock's beta as reported in Value Line, VLFU = Value Line forecast uncertainty as computed 
from width of high - low target stock price range.
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Table 2 
Tests for Value Line Forecast Bias 
 
Panel A: Annualized Common Stock Return, Month (t) to Month (t+48) 
Cohort Number of Mean Mean Mean   
Year Observations VLR48 R48 Pred. - Actual t-Statistic  
1969 65 19.389 3.049 16.341 9.454 *** 
1973 64 24.730 6.184 18.545 10.776 *** 
1977 65 28.307 7.539 20.769 10.473 *** 
1981 65 32.141 19.232 12.909 5.072 *** 
1985 65 18.682 19.323 -0.641 -0.375  
1989 65 15.638 8.423 7.216 3.119 *** 
1993 65 13.526 17.829 -4.303 -2.643 ** 
1997 65 9.697 -0.257 9.955 5.644 *** 
overall 519 20.255 10.173 10.083 12.966 *** 
 
Panel B: Total Percent Change in Earnings per Share, Year (t-1) to Year (t+4) 
Cohort Number of Mean Mean Mean   
Year Observations VLPCEPS PCEPS Pred. - Actual t-Statistic  
1969 61 71.613 27.914 43.700 2.943 *** 
1973 62 114.106 82.063 32.043 2.167 ** 
1977 62 81.527 2.227 79.300 3.263 *** 
1981 53 147.851 20.587 127.264 3.095 *** 
1985 49 61.779 18.945 42.834 3.573 *** 
1989 57 72.215 -11.741 83.956 6.380 *** 
1993 41 158.072 155.085 2.986 0.117  
1997 49 100.261 -20.070 120.331 4.059 *** 
overall 434 98.781 31.461 67.320 8.025 *** 
 
Panel C: Total Percent Change in Sales per Share, Year (t-1) to Year (t+4) 
Cohort Number of Mean Mean Mean   
Year Observations VLPCSPS PCSPS Pred. - Actual t-Statistic  
1969 62 35.090 55.569 -20.478 -3.450 *** 
1973 63 47.159 85.427 -38.269 -3.301 *** 
1977 63 48.636 56.409 -7.773 -1.550  
1981 56 57.096 7.431 49.665 9.980 *** 
1985 52 42.168 35.015 7.152 0.952  
1989 57 47.991 25.292 22.700 4.935 *** 
1993 49 39.406 23.808 15.598 3.655 *** 
1997 49 43.855 45.510 -1.655 -0.169  
overall 451 45.269 43.140 2.129 0.753  
 
Panel D: Total Change in Profit Margin, Year (t-1) to Year (t+4) 
Cohort Number of Mean Mean Mean   
Year Observations VLDPM DPM Pred. - Actual t-Statistic  
1969 62 1.353 -1.782 3.135 7.066 *** 
1973 63 0.911 -1.285 2.195 6.265 *** 
1977 63 0.542 -1.802 2.344 4.380 *** 
1981 56 0.773 0.163 0.610 1.118  
1985 52 1.098 -0.298 1.395 2.597 ** 
1989 57 0.915 -1.524 2.439 5.604 *** 
1993 49 3.123 2.728 0.395 0.870  
1997 49 1.439 -2.277 3.716 6.484 *** 
overall 451 1.223 -0.834 2.057 11.595 *** 
 
Panel E: Total Change in Earnings Yield, Year (t-1) to Year (t+4) 
Cohort Number of Mean Mean Mean   
Year Observations VLDEY DEY Pred. - Actual t-Statistic  
1969 62 -1.047 -5.088 4.042 0.595  
1973 63 -3.952 2.276 -6.228 -7.880 *** 
1977 62 -5.886 -13.712 7.826 1.242  
1981 54 -5.636 -7.415 1.779 1.228  
1985 52 -0.068 -4.243 4.175 2.555 ** 
1989 57 0.870 -6.555 7.425 3.501 *** 
1993 50 3.711 1.515 2.196 5.405 *** 
1997 49 1.202 -4.787 5.988 2.221 ** 
overall 449 -1.543 -4.846 3.303 2.401 ** 
 
Notes: Within each panel, the mean Value Line prediction is provided in column 3, the mean of the subsequently realized values in 
column 4 and the mean difference between the predicted and realized values in column 5. The t-statistic in column 6 is for the two-
tailed test that the mean of the predicted minus actual values equals zero. See Table 1 for further variable definitions. *, ** and ***, 
respectively, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 3 
Tests for Cross-Sectional Predictive Power 
   
Panel A: Realized Value
 
 =  α + β (VL Prediction) + eit, 
 
                                                             Model Estimated For:___         ______________________ 
Coefficient: 
Stock 
Return  %CH in EPS  
%CH in Sales 
per Share  
Change in 
Profit Margin  
Change in 
Earnings Yield 
 
α 9.304  -26.986  24.697  -1.700  -3.305  
 (6.321) *** (-1.546)  (5.365) *** (-8.832) *** (-2.516) ** 
           
β 0.0429  0.5917  0.4074  0.7084  0.9984  
 (0.630)  (2.652) *** (5.067) *** (5.671) *** (3.516) *** 
           
Test: β = 1, Chi-Sq 197.78 *** 3.35 * 54.31 *** 5.45 ** 0.00  
R-Squared 0.0011  0.4126  0.0602  0.1726  0.0691  
# of OBS 519  434  451  451  449  
 
 
Panel B: Realized Value
 
 =  α1D69 + α2D73 + α3D77 + α4D81 + α5D85 + α6D89 + α7D93 + α8D97 + β (VL Prediction) + eit, 
 
Where D69 – D97 are dummy variables representing the year during which the Value Line prediction was obtained. 
 
                                                             Model Estimated For:_____                    __ __________________ 
Coefficient: 
Stock 
Return  %CH in EPS  
%CH in Sales 
per Share  
Change in 
Profit Margin  
Change in 
Earnings Yield 
 
α1 6.099  -13.827  39.492  -2.638  -3.986  
 (3.055) *** (-0.727)  (5.903) *** (-6.472) *** (-0.589)  
           
α2 10.075  15.555  63.822  -1.860  6.437  
 (4.286) *** (0.618)  (5.673) *** (-5.899) *** (4.717) *** 
           
α3 11.992  -45.292  34.127  -2.145  -7.515  
 (4.659) *** (-1.802) * (4.790) *** (-4.192) *** (-1.379)  
           
α4 24.289  -65.590  -18.727  -0.326  -1.482  
 (9.169) *** (-2.049) ** (-2.604) *** (-0.625)  (-0.642)  
           
α5 22.262  -17.063  15.697  -0.992  -4.171  
 (11.233) *** (-1.002)  (1.909) * (-1.941) * (-2.546) ** 
           
α6 10.883  -53.833  3.305  -2.103  -7.471  
 (4.783) *** (-2.733) *** (0.510)  (-4.709) *** (-3.590) *** 
           
α7 19.957  62.951  5.755  0.753  -2.391  
 (9.878) *** (2.465) ** (0.937)  (1.266)  (-2.168) ** 
           
α8 1.268  -78.508  25.418  -3.187  -6.052  
 (0.694)  (-2.632) *** (2.374) ** (-5.258) *** (-2.249) ** 
           
β -0.1573  0.5828  0.4581  0.6322  1.0527  
 (-1.930) * (2.754) *** (4.357) *** (4.792) *** (3.743) *** 
           
Test: β = 1, Chi-Sq 201.51 *** 3.88 ** 26.55 *** 7.777 *** 0.04  
R-Squared 0.2601  0.4558  0.2350  0.2524  0.0902  
# of OBS 519  434  451  451  449  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Figures in parentheses below coefficient estimates are t-statistics. *, ** and ***, respectively, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels. 
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Table 4  
Tests for Value Line Stock Return Forecast Bias and Predictive Power, by Degree of Forecast Uncertainty 
 
Panel A: Tests for Forecast Bias 
 
VL Forecast Number Mean VL Mean VL Mean Mean   
Uncertainty Of Forecast Predicted Annual Realized Annual Pred. - Actual   
Quintile Obs Uncertainty Stock Return (%) Stock Return (%) Stock Return (%) t-Statistic  
        
P1 (low) 90 0.5726 17.837 12.152 5.685 3.7828 *** 
P2 91 0.8164 19.816 14.048 5.769 3.9815 *** 
P3 88 0.9737 18.669 10.668 8.002 5.0519 *** 
P4 93 1.1831 20.209 9.997 10.212 5.8309 *** 
P5 (high) 92 1.4399 25.232 9.142 16.090 6.0239 *** 
 
 
Panel B: Tests for Predictive Power. Model:   Realized Annual Return
 
 =  α + β (VL Predicted Annual Return) + eit, 
 
                                         Model Estimated For VL Forecast Uncertainty Quintile:                                                 _ 
Coefficient:  P1 (low)       P2   _        P3   _       P4   _   P5 (high)  
 
α 7.826  8.107  12.119  3.002  12.327  
 (2.995) *** (2.950) *** (3.702) *** (0.854)  (3.406) *** 
           
β 0.2426  0.2998  -0.0777  0.3461  -0.1262  
 (1.900) * (2.458) ** (-0.509)  (2.154) ** (-1.152)  
           
Test: β = 1, Chi-Sq 35.20 *** 32.96 *** 49.90 *** 16.56 *** 105.64 *** 
R-Squared 0.0318  0.0654  0.0030  0.0461  0.0130  
# of OBS 90  91  88  93  92  
        
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  Value Line Forecast Uncertainty (VLFU) is calculated as (Phigh - Plow) / 0.5(Phigh + Plow), where Phigh and Plow are, respectively, 
Value Line's 3-5 year projected high and low stock prices. We normalize the uncertainty variable by dividing each firm's result by the 
average calculated uncertainty of all Dow stocks in the same cohort year. Thus, firms with VLFU exceeding one have above average 
forecast uncertainty relative to all Dow stocks in a given year, and vice-versa. The quintiles vary slightly in number of observations 
because we did not allow breakpoints to occur between firms that had the exact same VLFU. *,** and *** denote, respectively, 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 5 
Realized Values for Portfolios Formed Based on Value Line Predictions 
 
 
Panel A: Portfolios sorted based on Value Line's Predicted Stock Return (VLR48) 
 
VLR48 
Quintile:   P1 (low)     p2           p3           p4        p5 (high)    #OBS 
 
R48           8.89      11.21        12.45        11.43         6.86       519 
ORTHR48       7.91      10.41        11.98        11.53         8.21       511 
VLR48        10.83      16.22        19.56        23.04        31.74       519 
PCEPS        28.50      25.94        35.53        59.39         6.01       434 
VLPCEPS      54.23      62.55       102.73        95.56       189.37       434 
DPM          -1.13      -0.73        -0.80         0.06        -1.64       451 
VLDPM         0.46       0.65         1.04         1.58         2.43       451 
 
 
Panel B: Portfolios sorted based on Value Line's Predicted %Change in EPS (VLPCEPS) 
 
VLPCEPS 
Quintile:   P1 (low)     p2           p3           p4        p5 (high)    #OBS 
 
R48          11.41       8.89         8.79        13.12         6.37       434 
ORTHR48       9.58       7.81         8.41        13.88         7.78       429 
VLR48        18.74      18.93        20.14        19.95        24.97       434 
PCEPS        -3.30       9.01        18.30        42.49        90.65       434 
VLPCEPS      19.42      40.09        59.89        84.62       289.44       434 
DPM          -2.19      -1.40        -1.26        -0.44        -0.48       432 
VLDPM        -0.50       0.27         0.81         1.40         2.79       432 
 
 
Panel C: Portfolios sorted based on Value Line's Predicted Change in Profit Margin (VLDPM) 
 
VLDPM 
Quintile:   P1 (low)     p2           p3           p4        p5 (high)    #OBS 
 
R48          10.07      11.94         8.94         8.91         9.25       451 
ORTHR48       8.91      11.05         8.65         9.17        10.97       446 
VLR48        21.27      20.62        19.52        19.45        22.91       451 
PCEPS        -3.83      17.73        22.39        62.13        67.34       432 
VLPCEPS      35.94      50.31        70.00       115.15       254.13       432 
DPM          -2.75      -1.14        -0.81        -0.48         1.01       451 
VLDPM        -1.15       0.14         0.71         1.60         4.82       451 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  Portfolios are formed ex-ante every 4 years beginning September 30, 1969 based on Value Line 3-5 year horizon predictions 
published between July 1 and September 30 of the same year. We report quintiles for the means of the following variables (a "VL" 
prefix in a variable name indicates a Value Line forecast): R48 = average annual stock return over subsequent 48 months; ORTHR48 
= average annual realized stock return orthogonal to relative market capitalization, book-to-market, stock return over previous 48 
months, and beta (as reported in Value Line); PCEPS = % change in EPS between year t-1 and the average of years t+3, t+4 and t+5; 
DPM =  change in profit margin between year t-1 and the average of years t+3, t+4 and t+5. 
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Table 6 
Robustness Tests 
 
Panel A: Tests with outliers trimmed 
 
Unbiasedness Tests.  Note: VL Forecast Error = VL Prediction - Realized                                                                    
___                      _____________________                                                                                                          _ 
 
Stock 
Return(%)  
%CH in 
EPS  
%CH in Sales 
per Share  
Change in Profit 
Margin (%)  
Change in 
Earnings Yield 
 
Mean VL Prediction 19.962  76.369  45.315  1.076  -1.436  
Mean Realized Value 10.297  22.712  39.965  -0.826  -2.009  
           
Mean VL Forecast Error 9.665  53.656  5.350  1.902  0.573  
t-Statistic 14.166 *** 9.350 *** 2.471 ** 12.373 *** 1.451  
# of OBS 494  412  429  429  427  
 
Tests for Predictive Power:  Realized Value
 
 =  α + β (VL Prediction)                                                                                 
___         ____________________                                                                                                                       __ 
Coefficient: 
Stock 
Return(%)  %CH in EPS  
%CH in Sales 
per Share  
Change in 
Profit Margin  
Change in 
Earnings Yield 
 
α 8.443  22.367  24.178  -1.260  -1.621  
 (6.975) *** (4.783) *** (7.664) *** (-8.436) *** (-3.944) *** 
           
β 0.0929  0.0045  0.3484  0.4037  0.2701  
 (1.739) * (0.085)  (5.758) *** (4.667) *** (1.808) * 
           
Test: β = 1, Chi-Sq 288.42 *** 347.83 *** 116.00 *** 47.54 *** 23.86 *** 
R-Squared 0.0065  0.0000  0.0840  0.0703  0.0412  
# of OBS 494  412  429  429  427  
Note: In these tests, the extreme 5% of realized values (top and bottom 2.5%) included in Tables 2 and 3, along with firm-matched VL 
predicted values, are trimmed. 
 
Panel B: Tests with alternative variable definitions 
 
Unbiasedness Tests.  Note: VL Forecast Error = VL Prediction - Realized Value 
                                                                                              _         _________________ 
 
Orthogonal Stock 
Return (%)  
Change in EPS as percent 
of Initial Stock Price  
Mean VL Prediction 20.407  8.365  
Mean Realized Value 10.025  1.504  
     
Mean VL Forecast Error 10.382  6.860  
t-Statistic 14.752 *** 8.274 *** 
# of OBS 511  453  
 
Tests for Predictive Power:  Realized Value
 
 =  α + β (VL Prediction) + eit, 
                                                                                    _    ____________ 
Coefficient: 
Orthogonal Stock 
Return (%)  
Change in EPS as percent 
of Initial Stock Price  
α 8.395  -0.0143  
 (4.151) *** (-0.772)  
     
β 0.0798  0.3504  
 (0.847)  (1.309)  
     
R-Squared 0.0022  0.0567  
# of OBS 511  453  
Note: The orthogonal stock return is defined as the constant term plus the residual from a regression of, respectively, R48 and VLR48 
on RMC (relative market capitalization), BM (book-to-market), PR48 (average annual stock return over prior 48 months) and BETA 
(as reported in Value Line). All independent variables in the regression are in deviation from the mean form. *,** and *** denote, 
respectively, statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 7 
Ex-Post Performance of 100 Stocks Listed in Value Line as Having the Greatest Appreciation Potential 
 
 
                               All 
                             Top 100         Safety         Safety         Safety       Timeliness       Top 33 
                              Stocks       Rank=1,2,3       Rank=4         Rank=5       Rank=1,2,3       Stocks 
 
 
Mean Excess Return            0.6957         0.5481         0.7536         0.9010         0.7276         0.5889 
                             (1.6477)       (1.4757)       (1.5861)       (1.5131)       (1.7130)*      (1.1788) 
 
Jensen's Alpha                0.0637        -0.0294         0.0883         0.2045         0.0889        -0.0629 
                             (0.2415)      (-0.1355)       (0.2716)       (0.4317)       (0.3374)      (-0.1714) 
 
FF 3-Factor Model Alpha      -0.2530        -0.3385        -0.1642        -0.1065        -0.1584        -0.3673 
                            (-1.4722)      (-2.2653)**    (-0.6761)      (-0.2736)      (-0.8394)      (-1.2739) 
 
4-Factor Model Alpha          0.1646        -0.0193         0.2922         0.5686         0.2383         0.3096 
                             (1.0405)      (-0.1359)       (1.2410)       (1.4914)       (1.3267)       (1.1553) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  Portfolios are formed ex-ante every 4 years beginning September 30, 1969 based on Value Line’s listing of the top 100 stocks 
by appreciation potential (these stocks have the greatest predicted total returns over a 3-5 year horizon). The “All Top 100 Stocks” 
column is for an equally-weighted portfolio holding all stocks on the list. The Safety Rank = 1,2,3, Safety Rank=4, and Safety Rank=5 
portfolios, respectively, contain stocks on the top 100 list with the indicated safety ranks, and the Timeliness Rank =1,2,3 portfolio 
contains stocks on the top 100 list with a timeliness rank of 3 or higher. The Top 33 Stocks portfolio is an equally weighted 
combination of the top one-third of stocks (ranked by predicted return) on the top 100 list. Figures in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates are t-statistics. *, ** and ***, respectively, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.  
 
